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THE QUEST FOR SELF RELIANCE, PARTICIPATION AND SOCIALISM:
Tanzania 1961-1982________________________________ _ _ ____
By Reginald Herbold Green'*'
A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage 
has to live in even worse conditions while he 
is rebuilding it and making a decent house for 
himself.
- President J.K. Nyerere
Development means liberation. Any action that 
gives (the people) more control over their own 
affairs is an action for development, even if it 
does not offer them better health or more bread.
- TANU 1971 Guidelines
If the people are to develop they must have power.
They must be able to control their own activities... 
the best intentioned governments - my own included - 
too readily move...into acting as if the people had 
no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong... 
people do know what their basic needs are...if they 
have sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to 
determine their own priorities for development.
- President Nyerere
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the 
reality of others may be - can only be transformed 
by detailed knowledge of it, by our own effort, by 
our own sacrifices...
- Amilcar Cabral, 
late President PAIEC
Politicisation, Participation and Consciousness Raising:
A Long March
Tanzania's dynamic of change and Tanzanian political and 
official thinking, language and tactics are distinctly different 
from thos'6 of most other "new (or would be) socialist states."
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The reasons are neither absentmindedness nor parochialism - 
they are rooted in perceptions of what is necessary and 
possible in the Tanzanian context, perceptions which alter 
in response to successes, failures and external events.
The pre 1954 political consciousness of most Tanzanians was 
both low and diffuse. Oppression was seen in terms of 
colonial rule and racial arrogance. Exploitation was 
similarly viewed - ie most Europeans and most Asians,not 
capitalists as a class let alone capitalism (territorial or 
global)t were the perceived enemy. This has been perceived 
to require politicisation both in the sense of mobilisation 
for successive limited goals and of parallel state/Party 
initiation of structural change. It has also been the basis 
for sustained emphasis on broad participation (and the rejection 
of a "Vanguard" or "Elite" Party), for an educational style of 
rhetoric and for an emphasis on a variegated array of educat­
ional approaches formal and informal, vocational and political.
The underlying assumption - sometimes made explicit - is that 
politicisation and participation will create and sustain a 
dynamic toward higher levels of consciousness.
Because the initial consciousness was nationalist and the 
available level of real resources/productive forces low, several 
potentially divergent themes have been stressed:
a) elements in pre-colonial African societies consistent with 
egalitarianism and communal participation/production/ 
distribution which, if transformed, would create a basis 
for socialist transformation, ie "Ujamaa" is almost overtly, 
a unifying national political myth (like "social contract") 
not an historical exegesis or a call for return to pre- 
European or pre-capitalist formations;
b) maintaining a broad consensus and avoiding the use of force 
against large minorities (class or otherwise defined) both 
on normative grounds and on practical non-feasibility ones;
c) utilizing and building up a citizen technocratic - managerial - 
bureacratic cadre whose consciousness was, and is, far from 
uniformly socialist (and still less pro-participation) and
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whose nationalist, egalitarian and basic needs commitments 
had (and have) distinctly authoritarian and paternalistic 
strands, because no other technical vehicle was to hand;
d) while systematically lowering the relative (and since 1972 
real) incomes of this salariat and creating participatory 
(from village and workplace to national) structures to 
direct, monitor and review their performance (including 
their patterns of relationships with workers and peasants);
e) in order to create over time a technical/professional cadre 
both genuinely competent and genuinely internally committed 
to socialist development;
f) major emphasis on increasing levels of productive forces - 
because failure to achieve this clearly meant continued 
rural poverty and inability to provide basic services;
g) in parallel with an emphasis on moving to universal 
provision of basic services (pure water, primary and adult 
education, preventative and basic curative medical 
programmes) and the opportunity for each household to earn 
enough to meet its own basic consumption needs;
h) and a consistent emphasis on reducing inequality of income 
(and access to services and to the political process) 
inequality because at any plausibly attainable level of 
productive forces affluence for the few meant deprivation 
for the majority (and the need for an exclusive, repressive - 
not a participatory, consciousness raising! - political 
process to sustain it.
This set of approaches - which have been at the heart of 
Tanzanian political economic strategy and practice at least 
since 1967, and less coherently since TANU (now CCM, the single 
Party) was founded in 1954 - are derived from perceptions and 
understandings of Tanzanian reality not from lack of thought or 
of commitment to a socialist transformation (which have more to 
do with not infrequent partial deviations from, and conflicts 
with, the mainstream).
The perceptions of constraints may or may not in part be wrong. 
The conclusions on strategy and tactics drawn may not necessarily
follow from them - or may even be self contradictory or 
ultimately inconsistent with a transition to socialism.
These are perfectly valid questions (and ones often canvassed 
in Tanzania). They are not very effectively pursued by 
laying down a set of blueprints from any other socialist 
transition and identifying all differences in Tanzania as 
deviations, heresies or mistakes. Tanzanian political 
thinking - at least, by proponents of socialist transformation - 
accepts there is one basic concept of and set of characeristics/ 
tests of socialism. But - with a limited number of elitist 
intellectual exceptions - it also contends that different 
contexts require very substantially different strategies, 
tactics, institutions, sequences of action and approaches to 
politicisation - mobilisation - consciousness raising.
Maji Maji, Mandate and Moderation: Milestones to Arusha
Tanxania's initial colonial experience under Germany was brief, 
dynamic, violent and brutal. The basic colonial economy and 
infrastructure were created in the two decades 1894-1914.
German conquest was initially relatively easy - small, weak and 
disunited pre-colonial states ensured that. German repressive­
ness led to subsequent attempts to reverse the conquest - 
notably Maji Maji in the south - suppressed with great brutality 
and loss of life.
British colonialism was relatively short, passive and authorit­
arian but neither very exploitative nor repressive. As a 
mandatory and trust territory Tanzania was a backwater seen as 
a marginal peripheral source of markets and labour to Kenya, 
South Africa and Rhodesia. The pattern begun under German 
rule of a few - not very successful - settlers, a limited 
(sisal, coffee, tea) estate sector, a number of African small­
holder areas and some labour reserves in a sea of territory 
and people of no real interest to the colonial power continued. 
Output for export increased slowly and fitfully - that 
(basically subsistence food) for local use almost as slowly 
and fitfully with recurrent severe foodshortages (and the 
beginning of a tradition of 'famine' relief). With a tiny 
European capitalist/bureacratic/professional cadre and an 
Asian middle stratum. Africans were nearly all peasants,
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unskilled workers or petty clerks with quite limited economic 
differentiation (other than in respect to the larger 
Kilimanjaro-Meru coffee growers and a few local notables used 
in the very diluted indirect rule apparatus). A less 
developmental system in economic or human terms would have 
been hard to devise but precisely for that reason it was not 
one which led to vehement grievances, recurrent violence or 
a high level of consciousness.
Politicisation on a mass level dates from the middle 1950s.
TANU (always de facto the sole party) systematically mobilized 
by relating local grievances (from land grabs through arrogant 
officials and cheating dukawallahs to land use and animal 
dipping regulations) to colonial rule to create a mass, 
nationally oriented base. In parallel (indeed interlocked) 
economic activism against Asian middlemen created the first 
(and strongest) cooperatives in the Lake cotton zone (an 
African smallholder initiative of the 1945-60 period) and the 
West Lake and Meru-Kilimanjaro coffee zones. These were 
marketing cooperatives run by a salariat basically responsible 
to a would be kulak farmer minority of their membership.
TANU's programme was nationalist. Not very surprisingly it 
was not socialist - no consciousness existed for such a 
stance and to have adopted it would have been to court colonial 
state repression and floating of seriously backed splitting 
parties (as occurred in Zanzibar). It was non-*tribal1 (with 
a hundred and fifty cultural groups none with even 10% of the 
population, it could hardly have been ‘tribal1 but it could 
have sought a 'cross-tribal' coalition). It was also secular 
in the sense of opposing both theocracy and state intervention 
in religious belief or organization while broadly affirming 
the importance of sacral bodies as private institutions and the 
total non-acceptability of political appeals, or denouncements 
based on religious lines. (Again a 30-40% Islamic, 25-30% 
Catholic, 10-15% Protestant/Anglican, 15-20% other religious 
makeup gave pragmatic reasons to reinforce normative ones).
More surprisingly TANU was and remained anti-racist. Given 
a fancy multiple electoral college system this was arguably
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tactically useful before independence, but its continuation 
and reinforcement after independence (there are directly and 
indirectly elected representatives and appointed officials 
of Asian, Creole, European and Arab ancestry) cannot be 
explained in that way. Initial mass consciousness was 
quite overtly and radically changed in this respect to: 
a) present the system (first colonialism and later global 
capitalism);not the individual as the enemy; b) to insist 
that not all members of any community were oppressors or 
exploiters (and later to insist some members of all 
communities were); c) to demand that individuals be judged - 
and then accepted or rejected - as persons not as manifest­
ations of a supposed mandithic community. This stand has 
been surprisingly successful - most Tanzanians have 
internalized it - so much so that it is easy to forget that 
as late as the eve of independence President Nyerere (the 
most determined anti-racist leader) had to threaten to 
resign to assure its continued dominance.
After independence TANUs programme - from its earlier years 
vaguely populist, left Catholic and/or social democratic in 
rhetoric - as enacted by the National Assembly and operated 
by the state machinery included:
a) an open market economy based on 1 industrialisation by 
invitation" and yeoman farmers C"improving peasants" or 
"neo-kulaks");
b) rapid citizenisation of public sector posts, especially 
in the bureaucracy proper and therefore a carefully 
planned high level personpower development programme;
c) concentration on expansion of health, water and basic 
education but on a rather uneven basis with no 
meaningful scenarios for achieving universality;
d) successful - in micro terms - building up of communal 
self help activity and conversion of the Party structure 
to a perceived (by peasants) means of seeking support 
but with no clear communal activity strategy nor Party 
interaction with the State.
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The results were not very surprising:
a) some growth was achieved (3 to 4% a year versus the 
colonial to 2%%) but its limits became painfully 
clear;
b) inequality among Africans - individually, on a sub-class 
and on an urban-rural basis - grew very rapidly, 
political leaders began to become private businessmen
at the same time;
c) a cadre of Tanzanian civil servants of both competence 
and nationalist convictions was built up as well as the 
beginning of a broader state directly productivs sector;
d) service expansion contributed to raising both expectations 
and inequality as much as access;
e) Party and communal activity roles remained subject to 
diverse and contradictory inter-relations.
None of this is very surprising or unusual. The difference 
in respect to Tanzania and to its leadership and Party was 
the response. The major affirmation of shift and clarification 
in the Arusha Declaration will be treated below but before that 
came the restructuring of the Party and Party/State relations.
Because TANU candidates were virtually never defeated and 
because its adoption of Westminster Party procedures stifled 
debate, the move to a single Party was in part intended to 
(and did) increase competitition in elections (which have in 
both State and Party been marked by relatively high turnover 
through voter rejection and promotion) and in dialogue/debate. 
It also legally established the supremacy of the Party over 
the Government as the basic decision taker for the State and 
the duty of the Government (including the National Assembly) 
to articulate, legislate and implement Party decisions. While 
clearly envisaging a necessity of day to day government 
autonomy (subject to review) and Party non-involvement in 
direct administration, the arrangements were not very clear 
on what this meant especially at regional, district workplace 
and village levels.
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"Socialism and Self Reliance": Declaration and Interpretation
Tanzania's 1967 statement on "Socialism and Self Reliance" 
(Arusha Declaration) was a Party policy decision and has 
remained at the centre of strategy and policy for 15 years.
It represented a radical shift from 1961-66 policy and 
practice, subsequent changes have been in terms of further 
steps, altered contexts and alternative instruments, not 
major changes of goals or principles. At least eleven 
main themes emerge:
1. Party supremacy - because this is a definitive strategy 
statement by the Party instructing the government to 
articulate and implement (which it promptly began to do);
2. People as the only end and justification and as the 
central means to development;
3. Human beings as existing fully only as persons within 
communities not as isolated individuals;
4. Priority to meeting the basic needs of all Tanzanians 
first (basic service provision, opportunity to earn 
decent household incomes; self reliance in the sense 
of self-respect and self-definition - and therefore 
participation in decision taking as elaborated more 
strongly in the 1971 and 1982 Mwonguzo ie Guidelines);
5. Therefore, concentration on the rural peasant sector 
where most people - and especially most very poor 
Tanzanians - are;
6. Egalitarianism via moving to universal service provision 
and reducing income inequality (in principle largely by 
evening up and secondarily by suppressing opportunities 
for exploitation);
7. Enhanced production to provide the resources for achieving 
socialism and self reliance;
8. State dominance in large scale directly productive enter­
prise ownership (including the entire financial and 
foreign trade sectors), state setting of the economic
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context via planning and policy (basically on a managed 
market basis) and - less clearly and over a longer period 
expansion of communal production at the rural, retail 
trade and workshop level (explicitly labelled socialism);
9. More participation of workers and peasants in decision
taking as well as in implementation (latter elaborated 
to include a commitment to decentralisation of decision 
taking so ordinary people could get at decision takers);
10. Basic reliance on Tanzanian resources (especially people 
and policies) because only Tanzanians had the right to 
decide for Tanzanians or were primarily concerned with 
the welfare of Tanzanians and Tanzania;
11. Rigid separation of public and private business to limit 
conflict of interest and mixed loyalties (ie draconic 
leadership code for Party, Government, parastatal senior 
personnel and leading to limiting of Party membership to 
workers and peasants).
The subsequent use of Party power and state policy instruments - 
ranging from the leadership code through nationalisation of 
landlords and from systematic compression of urban wage/salary 
differentials and raising grower prices relative to the minimum 
wage to creating Workers and Village Councils and workplace 
Party branches - have been consistent with the Declaration's 
targets and with an evolving consciousness of their implications.
The characteristics that have raised doubts in some observers 
(Tanzanian as well as external) whether this does constitute a 
socialist transformation include:
a. length - in fact Tanzania moved to public sector economic
dominance and effective Party supremacy in less than a decade 
which is not particularly slow if GDR figures for private 
sector up to 1960 are to be credited;
non-violence - whatever the virtues of a running start 
at the end of a civil or liberation war TANU could hardly 
have created (or justified creating) one. And - in contrast 
to Chile - domestic capitalist sub-classes were far too weak 
and external ones too little concerned to overturn or 
subvert the Party or regime;
mass party - TANU and CCM ideology includes a quis custodiet 
custodies? (who is to watch the watchers?) view as to the 
elite cadre approach in the Tanzanian context. CCM does 
have a cutting edge against indiscipline, has - within limits 
but substantially - enforced the Leadership Code and has 
developed higher and sharper levels of consciousness over time;
tendency to play down class struggle - arguably a verbal 
tactic more than an analysis of policy - the powerful capitalist 
sub-classes were foreign finance/external trade/industrial units, 
domestic proto-kulaks (and their creative the old-coop movement) 
and - more arguably - landlords and retail traders. All have 
been "struggled against" and either reduced to very subsidiary 
roles or substantially weakened. The deliberate use of 
relatively subdued language in respect to sub-classes and 
social groups (other than cattle thieves, smugglers, hoarders, 
profiteers - fairly specifically defined - and exploiters - 
so generally defined as not to have much potential for unplanned 
enthusiastic violence against anybody) has been based partly on 
a normative commitment to the broadest consensus possible 
without loosing course (not to universal agreement or 
non-use of state power to compel) and of arguing and educating 
rather than shouting and ordering,but also to a real perception 
of how fragile the new state and nation were (much less true 
today).
non-standard terminology - is a criticism of talking plain 
Swahili (or English) in preference to strange (to the audience) 
Marxist technical and rhetorical terminology and/or a distinct
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aversion to treating any secular document (including 
President Nyerere's) as Holy Writ. CCM leaders see 
the former as consistent with actually relating to and 
being subject to removal by peasants and workers and the 
latter as more "scientific socialism" than laboured, out 
of context, textual exegesis to "validate" concrete, 
contextual measures;
f. a certain zig zag approach to priorities in the medium 
term policy/action nexus. This approach (which is arguably 
dialectical and in one sense Maoist) turns on a commitment 
to concentrating on tackling a limited number of crucial, 
potentially immediately surmountable problems (antagonistic 
secondary contradictions) and - when temporary syntheses 
are attained - moving forward to the next set;
g. the bureaucracy has become the new class - is debatable - 
much of CCM (especially the President) perceive this as 
a major risk and repeatedly warn against it albeit the 
requirements of politicisation and leader initiatives to 
force the pace of consciousness raising create an acute 
tension in this respect. But the civil service - managerial 
elite have accepted and in large measure implemented (and
to a lesser and less uniform degree internalized) a socialist 
transformation ideology, lost ground absolutely and relatively 
economically (with surprisingly little organised dissent or 
even foot dragging and subterfuge) and (with more delaying 
and resisting tactics but no real counteroffensives) had 
their relative power and status (vis a vis peasants and 
workers) eroded. That pattern does not fit very well with 
the hypothesis of a dominant, neo (or state) capitalist 
technocracy as a sub class for itself.
Three caveats are needed in respect to this TANU/CCM ideological 
tour d'horizon. First, while practice broadly corresponds to 
ideology,it is substantially imperfect and on occasions marked 
by internal contradictions - especially in respect to anti­
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elitism and effective worker/peasant participation in 
decision taking and control over leaders. Second, as 
President Nyerere stresses "mistakes are mistakes... 
exploitation is exploitation.." and both have occurred at 
micro (and less frequently macro) level with correction 
sometimes lagged and partial. Third, TANU/CCM and its 
leaders are not romantic idealists, utopian intellectuals 
or Holy Idiots. The Party has gained, held and exercised 
power and sees that as a necessary (not sufficient) pre­
condition for attaining any of its substantive goals. 
President Nyerere is most certainly not naiive and soft - 
a socialist (or any other) statesmen to succeed requires 
many characteristics and styles very different from Mother 
Theresa (and vica versa). While generally using minimum 
force^CCM (including, indeed perhaps notably, the Chairman) 
will in the last resort smash opposition with a clenched 
fist - as such varied groups as large landlords, the Ruvuma 
Development Association, Oscar Kambona and his colleagues, 
the elitist intellectual 'left' fraction of the Party and 
Idi Amin have learned to their cost.
Social and Political Relations; Change and Inertia
Tanzania's transformation is revolutionary in goals and - 
in many aspects - cumulative results. However, it had a 
virtually standing start and is perceived as in constant 
danger of being pulled to a halt by inertia if acceleration 
is reduced (as arguably was the case in 1977-78 and is now 
a major contradiction given real resource constraints).
The political structure is a parallel one. The Party 
basically bottom up: 10 House Cell, Village/Workplace/
Residential Area Branches, District (Constituency) 
Conference, Regional Conference, National Congress (in 
principle every 5 years, in practice every 1 or 2), Natural 
Executive, Central Committee (full time), Chairman with the
top four levels supported by a (somewhat exigious) national 
and the others by (yet more exiguous) regional secretariats. 
Membership is of the order of 2,500,000 (25% of adults), 
discussion is reasonably open, elections are competitive 
with substantial turnover. Party wings exist for Labour, 
Women, Parents and Youth - the first three at least with 
substantial, self defined programmes.
The Party is the supreme policy making and review body.
Once it arrives at decisions these are to be administered 
by the government. During that process the Party is 
supposed to participate, comment, if necessary call on its 
own higher organs to investigate apparent violations of 
policy but not to act directly to reverse government actions 
(except at Congress-NEC-CC-Chairman levels)nor to administer. 
In practice substantial grey areas and tensions exist. Most 
Party officials are not Public Sector senior functionaries 
and vica versa.
The Government1s representative side consists of President- 
Prime Minister-Cabinet-National Assembly (about 60% competitive 
direct elections after Party nomination, 30% indirect 
competitive elections, 10% Presidential appointment). Its
duty is to articulate and implement policy via the civil 
service (central ministries, and decentralized regional 
'multi purpose ministries') and parastatals.
The Party and representative systems are competitive and 
relatively open. The bureaucracy (and to a somewhat lesser 
degree the managocracy) is relatively civil and of service 
to policy instructions and usually fairly diligent (sometimes 
surprisingly so but sometimes in odd ways) in articulating 
and implementing. Its degree of civilness to "clients" 
varies widely with the lowest levels (who see themselves 
as having no status except power to say "No" and are
ordered from above to be participatory) the most resistant
to change. The dominant ethos probably is paternalistic/ 
mildly authoritarian/quasi hierarchical but with
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Isignificant participatory/client service/democratic 
tendencies.
The dominant voluntary organisations are churches and 
mosques which have a greater or lesser claim on the 
allegiance of three quarters of all Tanzanians. Relatively 
little conflict (not none, eg with Lutherans over family 
planning, Catholic bishops over blanket condemnation of 
violence in South Africa, Watchtower over definition of 
secular authority as satanic) has arisen but there are 
also relatively low and uneven levels of sustained inter­
action and dialogue (again not none - the Christian Medical 
Commission and YMCA/YWCA are significant).
Other voluntary organisations (beyond non-agricultural co-ops) 
are neither very large nor significant. A bevy of Western 
ones from Scouts and St. John's Ambulance to Roundtable/ 
Rotary (which is of some importance) exist as do some 
traditional ones but none has wide membership nor a really 
large programme (albeit in some areas eg education of 
handicapped, eye clinics they are critical). Most voluntary/ 
communal efforts are in fact Party, Party Affiliate or 
Village based.
The political influence of the Armed Forces (never used at 
home) is low albeit because they are not seen as inherently 
separate from society members can become leaders (usually 
on leave of absence) - as can clergy. The Police have no 
political influence. Given their limited numbers they are 
surprisingly effective against crimes of violence and 
robberies of the urban poor but their weak technical 
capabilities (including prosecution) create a tendency 
(by no means unique to Tanzania) to third degree and long 
pre-arraignment detention tactics (officially disapproved 
and sometimes exposed by lawyers and press with subsequent 
state sanctions). They are not by world standards brutal 
nor very corrupt.
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The Militia are normally non-political (a cross section of 
workplace or village),and non-useable except for home defence 
or against a small, unpopular minority position. The 
exceptions occur when younger age groups or poorer peasants 
dominate but their political influence then is more as a 
voluntary organisation than as militia.
Tanzanian culture/cultures are varied on local, ethnic, 
"modernisation", education lines in a way perhaps more 
variegated than but not radically dissimilar from - say - 
turn of the century Britain. Ethnicity/parochialism is 
also analogous to that model - mild distrust of 'outsiders', 
jokes/denigration of some groups, normally willingness to 
evaluate individuals as persons. Tanzanians are now 
notably non-racist - a consciousness almost certainly 
resulting from Party (and especially Presidential)
'mass education'.
The basic support groups for the Party's strategy ideology 
are peasants, urban workers (with more reservations), a 
majority of intellectuals, and (with substantial reserv­
ations and a number of exceptions) managers - professionals - 
civil servants. Business attitudes are very mixed.
Opposition centres on kulak/economic activist proto sub­
classes (clearly threatened by Socialism and participation), 
a minority of civil servants and managers (same perceptions), 
a minority of intellectuals (largely left elitists who view 
participation as inherently fraudulent and assert they 
represent "true" peasant and worker consciousness but have 
historically had rather high proportions of racial 
chauvinists and defectors to compradorism) and - in a 
very passive (tendency to withdraw literally) way - many 
of the Asian community (clearly threatened - at least in 
future generations - by egalitarianism as well as socialism, 
given Tanzania's poverty).
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cSerious internal threats (since the 1964 army/trade union 
mutiny) have not existed with the possible exception of 
the post-Arusha Kambona defection and coup attempt. The 
sub-class bases and the structures of the opponents are 
very weak and fragmented and even among most of them 
nationalism and acceptance of the State's legitimacy are 
significant barriers to serious sedition.
The Party and official political/intellectual spectrum 
are rather broad. The dominant tendency is non-orthodox, 
participatory socialism but a social democratic (in UK 
sense) tendency is of some significance and a New Left one 
has been at times, while there are recurrent outbreaks of 
neo-authoritarianism (usually over the messiness of 
enthusiasm and slowness of participation).
Human rights are seen as comprising civil/political (eg 
freedom of speech, right to participate in decisions - 
including elections, independent judiciary) and social/ 
economic (eg opportunity to earn decent income, universal 
access to basic services, ability to organise at village 
and workplace level to complement State action to achieve 
these). CCM, on the whole, views both areas as requiring 
progress but the former as more advanced (and posing fewer 
basic obstacles to progress) than the latter. It does 
not see these as "individual" or "collective" since it 
sees freedom of speech as necessarily in a community and 
the right to eat as necessarily applying ultimately to 
individual persons.
Women's liberation (not by that title) has received rather 
uneven and, until 1975 limited, attention. On the other 
hand tertiary education is now 25% female and middle level 
personnel perhaps 10% (versus say 10% and 2% in 1967) as 
are most representative bodies. Similarly universal 
primary education (basically achieved), universal literacy
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(75% achieved), accessible pure water (85% urban, 40% plus 
rural), rural wood supply (a growing programme) and family 
spacing - health education - child and mother care (priority 
health sub-sectors albeit the first is largely under a "quasi 
voluntary" umbrella for tactical reasons) benefit women 
disproportionately, enhance their status and have very strong 
(male as well as female) support. Women's participation in 
communal, self organized groups and household decisions is 
very uneven and often very subordinated (by locality, 
community, age group) but apparently rising.
Basic services (education, health, water and - less systematically - 
housing), access to decent employment/self employment opportun­
ities and participatory organisation are seen by CCM as the 
main routes to social transformation both materially and in 
terms of human relationships. The first has been clearly 
articulated and allocated very substantial resources. The 
second has received more resources (and a degree of institut­
ional enforcement) but arguably has been less systematically 
(or attainably?) articulated. The last - while making very 
substantial progress over 1967-82 - is the least advanced 
and the area of the most opposition (even from within the 
Party) and partial setbacks.
Repression in Tanzania is low - for one thing there is not very 
much to repress. Fear of repression is apparently wider - 
but very often publicly expressed to casual acquaintances and 
senior leaders alike which casts some doubt on how severe it 
is. In general repression flows from three sources:
a. "clear and present danger" - ie Kanbona Coup group, 
certain agents (or believed agents) of outside enemies, 
foreign exchange racketeers/smugglers (seen as clear 
danger to national economic security);
b. inability of the (independent but also rather slow and 
limited capacity) prosecuterial/court system to cope 
(eg petty economic offenders, accused cattle thieves);
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c. Police and local administrator authoritarianism (eg 
local rate offenders, vociferous lunatics, habitual 
petty criminals, "nuisances").
There are currently no political prisoners (never more than 
20 mainland ones) but perhaps 100-200 "economic security" 
detainees (Presidential order), 300-500 regional/district 
administrative detainees (legal for 24-48 hours but subject 
to abuse) and 500 up non-arraigned "Police detainees" and 
unduly delayed "undertrials." This is an issue of concern 
to the Party, eg the Attorney General at a public meeting 
agreed there were abuses and the use of detention should be 
narrowed and the basic paper calling for ending it was 
presented (as an individual) by a serving (then and now)
Senior State Attorney. How much worker and peasant concern 
there is may be quite different (ie "lock more up" is most 
likely view). Police and administrator abuses have been 
acted against by the Ombudsman, press, lawyers and Party - 
with some effect. When administrative detention and 
police detention/torture resulted in deaths (1968 and 1977) 
trials (and convictions)for manslaughter of senior admin­
istrators/police officers ensued.
Regulation of publication, organisation and assembly is 
draconic on paper (largely inherited from before independence) 
but - except for public marches - rarely in practice. The 
real constraints on publication/communication are cost, 
limited - fragmented audiences, shortgage of paper/ink 
(foreign exchange). There is a substantial independent 
newspaper (Church) and printers (Church and commercial), 
usually several journals (usually left critics or vehement 
populist) and a number of critical volumes (and newspaper 
features, leaders, letters to editor) from the public 
sector press (largely from the left or non-ideological 
programmatic). The Party would not claim freedom of 
expression is fully effective but would argue the causes 
were material not ideological or repressive. However, 
support for local wall newspapers or village video-tape
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efforts has been near-nil (admittedly the present barriers 
are bureaucratic hostility but the Party could overcome 
them if it gave the issue of local two way communication 
priority).
The Quest for National Economic Integration
Tanzanian economic development policy parameters flow 
fairly directly from the basic goals in or evolving from 
the Arusha Declaration. They can best be summed up as 
national economic integration (of production/use structures, 
of geographic areas and of household opportunities to earn 
decent incomes) within managed market planning and reduction
of exploitation.
■*-
Rural transformation is perceived to be the base of the 
national economy and its development as elaborated in the 
following section. Infrastructure provision has had a 
high priority to prevent or reduce power, water and transport 
barriers to enhanced production. Industrial development 
has been seen as a key to integrating production and use 
structures, reducing import dependence and raising average 
levels of productive forces and surplus generation.
Financial infrastructure creation has been promised an 
increasing control over resource allocation, raising and 
centralizing surpluses and avoiding purely financial (as 
opposed to real resource) constraints on economic 
development.
The evolution of ownership has been toward state (including 
joint ventures seen as individually transitory, but as a 
sub-sector long term) dominance in large and medium scale 
production with near 100% in finance and external trade; 
peasant and - in the long term - communal small scale rural 
production (with limited large state and private exceptions 
for a few crops); a substantial but relatively declining 
medium and small scale domestic private sector; a very small 
(residual) foreign owned private sector and a growing 
decentralized public sector and non-agricultural co-operative
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small and middle sized sector.
The actual evolution is along these lines except in relation 
to the last sector. Beyond village level (where results are 
mixed) decentralized public sector enterprises (in trade, 
transport, agriculture and manufacturing alike) have a record 
of nearly uniform disaster - in sharp contrast to state owned 
parastatals which through 1978 had an uneven but generally 
fairly good (better than private sector) productivity and 
profitability record. Co-operatives (other than villages) 
have remained negligible and small private industry proved 
more dynamic than expected.
Industrialisation strategy after 1967 evolved toward a basic 
industry - ie broadly consumed products, intermediate inputs 
into their production, basic construction materials, spares 
and engineering aspects of capital goods plus initial equip­
ment/machine building, value added enhancing pre-export 
processing or manufacture (the most contentious area) - 
pattern which was formalized over 1974-76. This did 
produce relatively high intra sectoral linkages and low 
direct import levels (20 to 25% average) in the sector as 
well as high growth rates until 1974 and over 1977-78. 
However, because of the shift in investment makeup toward 
machinery and equipment it barely held the import content 
of investment at two thirds.
Further because sectoral exports lagged, it remained 
dependent on foreign exchange surpluses from other sectors 
to maintain its trend capacity utlisation of 70% - as the 
fall to 25-30% in 1982 under massive import constraints 
illustrates—with the difference (as opposed to direct 
manufactured goods imports) that each shilling of unavail­
able foreign exchange extinguished five shillings of pre 
tax manufactured goods supply (say eight to nine at retail 
prices) and four of domestic production, two or more of 
government sales and company tax revenue and over one of 
investible surplus.
Tanzania over 1967-74 became a planned economy but not one 
with a close resemblance to either the Soviet or Western 
academic models. The least dissimilar parallel is Hungary 
but this was not a direct influence and the evolution of the 
system was heavily influenced by the much greater macro and 
sectoral planning priority of the Treasury than of the 
Ministry of Planning (which gave primacy to micro public 
sector project budgeting at least until the late 1970s).
Its main elements were market management by price and tax 
incentives/deterrents backed by allocation of commercial 
bank (and less systematically public enterprise surpluses, 
'Development1 Budget allocations and investment bank credits) 
as well as of foreign exchange. Pre-1974 physical balance 
planning was negligible as neither the Treasury nor financial 
institutions had the capacity nor Planning the interest. 
Public sector investment was - and is - basically on a 
decentralized initiative (from village or parastatal up)/ 
centralized coordination and allocation pattern with some 
financial but few physical consistency tests.
Since 1974 some ad hoc physical balances planning and 
allocation has been done: staple foods (fairly effectively),
basic consumer goods (oddly with significant resultant 
deliveries to a number of small towns and rural areas), fuel 
(with major 'leakages') and basic construction materials 
(with no evident results). However, no coherent approach 
to cross checking financial and physical consistency at 
macro and sectoral level (as opposed to scarce, key item 
allocation) has evolved.
Personnel constraints - now primarily in middle level 
personnel with top level apparent gaps the result of 
negligible backup below - have always been severe. The 
combination of 4-5% trend rates of real growth, increasing 
production/services/government complexity and a minimal 
independence lay high (or even middle) level citizen cadre 
meant that even massive planned personpower development 
efforts (from 1961 in respect to high level and - on a
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decentralized basis - from the early 1970s at middle level) 
and achievements left substantial shortages. The two worst 
areas have been applied engineering and accountancy with 
dire effects on technological capacity (including maintenance) 
and financial control.
Massive reduction of inequality at intra-urban and urban-rural 
levels (but apparently not intra-rural for which results are 
ambiguous) was sought and achieved. Pre tax differentials 
between the top 5% and bottom 20% of wage/salary earners in 
the government fell to about 4.5 to 1 and in the public enter­
prises to under 6 to 1 by 1981. (Post income tax top 1% to 
bottom 20% differentials were under 6 to 1.) Average rural 
consumption power rose to 60-75% of minimum wage/urban self 
employed by 1977 (possibly only slightly above 1961 ratios 
but radically above 1966). Tax policy reinforced both of 
these trends as did increasingly broad access to basic 
services.
However this sustained trend had three phases. To about 1972 
it was evening up - promotions offset static salary scales 
for most of the citizen salariat. Over 1972-1981 moderate 
cuts in real wages were in contrast to much higher ones in 
real salaries (and modest increases in real grower prices) 
while in 1982 it has been a clear case of "all boats float 
lower." Since 1978 a clear exception has burgeoned - 
"entrepreneurs of adversity" (or efficient, flexible 
capitalists or two legged/wingless vultures if you prefer)
- ie bribe takers, engrossers and forestallers, smugglers 
and Forex dealers - who have waxed fat as vultures usually 
do during crises.
Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP (excluding 
1978-80 over related defence spending) peaked in 1974.
Since 1979 (ie beginning 1980) real government spending 
has been cut annually probably 20% by 1982. The revenue 
base collapse from imported input constraints has meant 
that this has barely reduced the real recurrent deficit.
Over 1973-80 government employment rose on a 5-6% a year 
trend and real government wage/salary bill was virtually 
static - a telling indicator of real salary and wage cuts.
It has led to a pathological situation of far too many staff 
to work fully with existing supporting resources leading to 
frequent low morale and enforced idleness often becoming 
habitual. (Staff reduction - as in 1975 under active 
consideration - would reduce the deficit and inflation, 
alter consumption power patterns but not raise supporting 
resources much as these are foreign exchange constrained.)
Exports crucial role in transforming domestic resources into 
necessary imports was overlooked, misunderstood or denigrated 
over 1967-72 (with a few dissenting voices), only verbally 
deferred to in 1973-1979 and raised to the priority action 
agenda only over 1980-81. Through 1973 this appeared a 
minor error - the balance of payments including readily 
available concessional flows was rather well under control. 
The 1977 coffee/tea boom masked the secular damage done to 
the external balance by 1973-75 relative price changes and 
(as reserves rose to a record level late in the year) 
created a false sense of non-urgency cruelly dispelled over
1978-82.
Results from 1967 to 1977 (including the 1974-76 Emergency 
Programme) were broadly in the right direction and at 
acceptable rates. Overall production was on a 4% to 5% 
growth trend and agricultural about 4%, manufacturing 
was growing and deepening, basic services were increasingly 
available (with universal literacy, pure water supply and 
basic health service access by the mid 1990s looking quite 
plausible), life expectancy reached 51 (from 35 or 42 at 
independence - the data are contradictory), inflation 
settled back to 6-8%, the foreign balance appeared to be 
under control, inequality fell with some grumbling (at the 
top over erosion and the bottom over modesty of gains), 
personpower resources - and to a degree efficiency of 
public sector operation - rose. The 1978-82 picture -
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as elaborated in the penultimate section - is very different, 
most succinctly summed up as facile descensus Avernum. By 
1981 terms of trade losses and enhanced security costs meant 
that per capita national resource use power (excluding defence) 
was about a sixth below 1977 and 5-6% below 1972 despite 
static constant price output per capita over 1977-82 (+ 5-6% 
77-80, - 6% 81) and over 6% growth since 1972.
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Community and Communal Activity; Toward Rural Transformation 
Tanzanian rural transformation strategy has had five abiding - 
basically complementary but sometimes contradictory - themes:
1. creating communities as a basis for fuller human inter­
action and greater self reliance (than isolated homesteads 
or hamlets);
2. providing basic services (pure water, basic education, 
preventative and basic curative health services) on a 
path leading to universal access;
3. raising rural production to enable households to meet 
their basic consumption needs (and in so doing to feed 
the non-rural sectors and expand the industrial and export 
base);
4. building up communal production and investment (in infra­
structure, housing, services and manufacturing/repair as 
well as agriculture);
5. increasing peasant power both within rural communities and 
vis a vis outside officials and manager.
Land reform (conversion from freehold to communally allocated 
tenure generally and abolition of quasi-feudal tenure in one 
region) pre-dates the Arusha Declaration. In general inequality 
of landholding (especially in land scarce areas) is low but 
specific patterns of inequality and land "consolidation" via 
manipulating communal allocation procedures have been acted 
against since 1967 to some effect. Neo-kulak farmers are 
no longer a growing sub-class albeit in their strongest areas - 
near Mounts Meru and Arusha - they have not lost existing 
holdings nor been prevented from continuing moderately successful 
capitalist farming.
Ujamaa (communal) villages have gone through three stages.
Until 1969 they were diverse, few and peripheral to policy 
and practice. Over 1969-71 the strategy was rapid movement to 
largely communal production in a limited number of villages.
In response to a demonstrated peasant preference for many
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villages with lower initial levels and slower buildup of 
communal production, the policy shifted to "broad front" 
over 1971-73 by the end of which year about 30% of peasants 
were in Ujamaa villages broadly defined (and 15% in 
'traditional' villages). Over this period fairly major 
educational, rhetorical, resource and policy inputs were 
provided. Coercion (both pro and con) was relatively rare 
but far from unknown.
After 1973 Ujamaa in villages continued (and continued to 
expand) but villagization - in the community and community 
government senses - was made compulsory by the Party Congress 
to be implemented over 1974-1977. A grass roots wave of 
'enthusiasm' (apparently dominantly local party official - 
certainly neither central nor civil service) led to a 
remarkable number of technical errors and unprecedentedly 
high levels of coercion in 1974-75. In that year perhaps 
30% of peasants moved - at most one third (probably less) 
relatively or very unwillingly. In 1975-76 rather more 
were shown as'villagizing' but half were by redefining 
traditional villages. More notable sharp Party reaction 
to 1974-75 'enthusiasm'/coercion prevented its repetition.
Village self government - with more or less content - is 
universal. Village communal investment (totalling $150-200 
million) is nearly so albeit very unequal by village. It is 
dominated by water facilities, health and education buildings, 
minor roads and houses with godowns, vehicles, afforestation/ 
woodlots, land clearing, stores (and contents) and workshops 
also significant. Communal economic activity is common with 
agricultural marketing and retail trade by far the dominant 
areas. Perhaps 3% to 5% of crop production (and about the 
same proportion of acreage) is communal concentrated in under 
a tenth of all villages (albeit communal agricultural service 
provision is somewhat commoner) while - beyond village dairy 
herds, oxen or breeding stock - animal production is virtually 
100% household based.
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Ujamaa and villagization have had no clear macro effect 
on output (1974 declines, 1975-78 rises and 1979-82 
relative stagnation cannot be related to post harvest 
1974 through mid 1976 moves - they can be related to 
weather, wartime dislocation and imported input availability).
At micro level positive and negative cases can be identified.
While the service provision aspects of villagization have 
been exploited, the technical possibilities (e.g. for extension, 
crop rotation) have not been nor have some of the problems 
(e.g. more intensive land use near villages, erosion) been 
handled adquately. This relates in large measure to the 
passive hostility of many (and the active hostility of an 
influential minority) of agricultural personnel - backed by the 
autonomous, dominant policy body of the 1975-79 period 
(Marketing Development Bureau) to the whole idea of villagization 
because it meant change, new approaches and greater peasant 
power vis a vis officials. In the face of effective peasant 
resistance to coercion most passively said whatever a particular 
auditor wished to hear and did near nowt. Interestingly education, 
health, water and forestry (and less clearly or uniformly local 
government) reacted much more positively and creatively.
Co-ops have a chequered history. Instituted by a non-peasant 
'economic activist1, proto kulak alliance in export crop zones 
as part of the nationalist struggle they built up on largely 
autonomous national institutional power structure and were 
extended - often by fiat - to other areas. Most were capitalist 
oriented, many were horrendously inefficient - high cost and/or 
corrupt, a majority were both. From 1967 to 1976 a campaign 
of erosion first clipped their institutional (especially rural 
credit and banking) power and imposed government supervision 
and then transferred primary society functions to villages while 
abolishing higher tiers. At the time the move was popular 
except in areas which had had strong, efficient co-ops (notally 
Kilimanjaro). Ironically the openly capitalist, kulak co-op 
(Tanzania Farmers Association) was treated as a special case 
and left unscathed.
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1982 moves to restore co-ops (along with the long awaited 
recreation of district representative institutions 
envisaged but delayed since 1974-75) are not a simple 
restoration of the old order. The village primary societies 
remain the base (with voluntary 'production team1 co-ops an 
optional addition). They will be able to create district/ 
regional co-ops clearly as representative bodies but also to 
carry out as yet to be determined in detail storage, transport 
and intra-regional marketing functions. Their power structure 
is likely (not certain) to be significantly more participatory 
than over 1961-76.
Production policy has been largely price incentive (including 
input subsidy) based. Our 1976-70 and 1974-81 peasant prices 
for officially purchased crops rose faster than the cost of 
living (or - especially since 1974 - than wage and salary or 
urban small self employed incomes). However over 1975-79 
price relativities were set incredibly badly nearly destroying 
the fourth ranking (and most promising) export - cashew nuts.
1979-82 modifications have partially restored rationality but 
with the rapid decline in real global prices of export crops 
and equally rapid rises in real transport costs, real price 
incentives to their producers mean deficits to be met from 
taxation (even if crop authority efficiency is recreated in 
several cases - e.g. grain, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum; augmented - 
e.g. cotton, cashew or raised from relatively high levels - 
coffee).
Education in agricultural production (as opposed to sanitation, 
construction, afforestation) has been very weak as noted above 
with usually inadequate extension backed by usually still less 
adequate or tested research despite relatively high expenditure 
levels on them. Rhetorical incentives have tended to be just 
that in respect to production (except the "grow more or starve" 
campaign of 1975 following 1973 and 1974 droughts) and with 
predictally meagre results. Coercion - despite rather lavish 
enactment of by-laws - is in fact uncommon and - except in 
special cases where backed by village community pressure - 
quite ineffective. The net effect of this trio has usually
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been negative - bad advice, wordy irrelevance and occasional 
harrassment grow no maize, pick no cashewnuts, and at least 
moderately alienate some peasants.
Surplus extraction from agriculture is now - by almost any 
empirical test - negative. (This was very much not the case 
over 1961-67 and probably not until 1978 albeit, excluding 
coffee, the turning point may have been 1974.) Net government, 
private sector and financial institution transfers are non­
peasant to peasant sector. Physical output ratios for 
peasants are lower than for most non-agricultural sectors 
when compared to world levels (i.e. by Amin's - though not 
Emmanuel's—definition the "unequal exchange" is rural biased). 
Relative to minimum wages grower prices rose from a base of 
100 in 1975 to 145-160 in 1981 (the real minimum wage unlike 
the grower prices fell). The middle 40% (and top 20%) of 
peasants have on balance more food, usually (not always) 
more housing but markedly less manufactured consumer goods, 
'nugatory household expenditure' (e.g. transport to work, 
urban rates) and access to services than urban minimum wage 
earners (and the bulk of urban self employed who are in the 
70 to 120% of minimum wage range). The peasant sector 
produces vital inputs into other sectors and - by producing 
exportables - allows their surpluses to be transformed into 
foreign exchange for imports;but it is itself apparently a net 
user not provid of surplus; a situation eminently consistent 
with Tanzanian strategy but making restoration of a 20% 
national monetary saving to monetary product rate very difficult.
Production growth has been uneven by year, by crop and among 
series. The least bad estimate of 1967-82 trend is 3\ - 4% 
annual growth overall, 4 to 4^% for peasant production, 4%% 
for total food production (4^ - 5%% peasant alone) and to -1% 
for industrial/export crop output (0 to + for peasant 
production alone). Overall this record is marginally above 
the 1960-61/1965-67 trend but much higher for food and lower 
for other crops. The physical estimates, however, have a 
spurious stability - reporting officers estimate acreage 
changes better than those in yield. Thus 1976-78 output 
is understated and 1979-81 overstated.
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The evident food supply problem - urban except in isolated
rural crop failure cases - does not seem to turn primarily
on production problems. It has at least four other components:
high losses related to bad non-peasant storage (e.g. 600,000 tonnes
loss 1976-79); poor (and high cost) transport; rapid shifts to
rice and wheat which outstripped possible short run
production enhancement; a qualitative change in per cent
of food buyers (basically urban) from 3% to 20% of the
population over 1961-81 with growers falling from 97% to
80%. Historically Tanzania has never been a net food
exporter on a sustained basis, larger swings since 1972
may relate to longer weather cycles, more intra year losses
and better support of consumption levels than to output
problems narrowly defined.
"A world we never made...":The External Setting
Tanzania has followed an independent foreign policy and 
maintained a firm opposition to (not to say prickliness 
about) attempts to interfere in or pressure its domestic 
or foreign policy since well before the Arusha declaration.
Its foreign policy in both substance (e.g. sustained support 
for Chinese entry into the UN and for condemnation of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and style (fairly urbane 
and skillful dialogue with a relatively high intellectual, 
compromise and analytical content) is more readily related 
to its domestic orientations and goals than to any standard 
"East-West" dichotomy.
The majority official position certainly perceives global 
capitalism as an inequitable system but sees the ambitions 
and influence of superpowers (USA, USSR) and, on occasion, 
near superpowers (Federal Germany, Japan, and - in Tanzania's 
context not so oddly - the UK and France) as presenting more 
immediate dangers. Middle level (e.g. Scandinavia, Canada, 
Netherlands, Italy, EEC as an institution), African (e.g.
Front Line States, Algeria) and other Third World states 
(e.g. China, Yugoslavia, India and less consistently several 
of the Gulf States, Cuba, Brazil and Mexico) have been seen
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as more equal and compatible partners. This relates partly 
to lack of a will to (or capacity for) hegemony, partly 
to believed common interests or concerns - especially 
in respect to negotiating international economic reform, 
partly on positions in respect of Southern African liberation 
and in many cases some overlap in attitudes toward egalitarianism 
and priority to basic human needs.
There is in fact no standard ideological pattern either 
to Tanzania's preferences in external relations nor to 
external attitudes toward Tanzania's attempts to achieve 
a transition to socialism and self reliance. On balance 
the positive elements have predominated most in respect 
to left liberal, social democratic and heterodox socialist 
countries. Indeed "Trade Union of the Poor" and Southern 
African liberation ideological tests tend to give a better 
fit to attitudes to and relations with Tanzania.
Tanzania has been too small, too weak, too far from 
conflagrations, with too few internal dissidents and too 
independent for any major state to see suppression, subversion 
or cp-optation as worth the cost. Aid suspensions have been 
not infrequent but smacked more of petulance than purpose 
whether by the USA, USSR, Federal Germany or UK. On the 
other hand, it has usually been - because it seemed unusual, 
to some attractive, regionally influential and fairly clear 
and cogent in international discourse - perceived by most 
states with active foreign policies as worth keeping at 
least on terms of polite discourse.
In Africa the position is somewhat different but also complex. 
Tanzania has been unusually (if unevenly) outspoken about 
abusive regimes (e.g. Amin, Micombero) and - to the extent 
its policies have succeeded or been believed by radicals to 
succeed - a source of some disquiet to some conservative 
states (notably Kenya). On the other hand Tanzania's 
commitments to regional cooperation - economic and vis a 
vis South Africa - on the principle of in unity is strength
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and to national self determination mean that it has good 
relations with a number of quite conservative states 
(e.g. post Amin Uganda, Botswana, post Micombero Burundi,
Rwanda and - somewhat surprisingly - Guinea)and quite 
correct and fairly consequential ones with others (e.g .Zambia, 
Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, Swaziland, Zaire).
Tanzania has probably given more priority to regional 
collective self reliance than any other Third World state.
After the collapse of the East African Community (related 
more to Amin's regime in Uganda and to ill judged Kenyan 
regional hegemonic ambitions than to socialism or external 
influence) it has concentrated on specified common interest 
promoting groupings notably the FLS, the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference and the Kagera Basin 
Authority. Ideologically this represents an emphasis on 
state management, specific goods and production over laissez 
faire, general themes and trade - partly because Tanzania has 
come to see the latter (by whoever promoted) as, at best, 
foreign capitalist intellectual imperialism and as objectively 
unsuited to African contexts, most of all among states with 
significantly different political economic orientations.
Tanzania has been the object of border raids, invasions or 
the threat of one or the other or engaged in defending 
friendly states (Seychelles, Mozambique, and - most unsuccess­
fully - Comores) in every year since 1967. Numerically the 
greatest number relate to Southern African liberation (including 
RSA based coup attempts in Seychelles) but the most serious 
and costly, by far, was Amin's invasion and involvement in 
subsequent Ugandan liberation and stabilisation. While clearly 
related in most cases to Tanzania's strategy and orientation, 
these attacks were not particularly related to its specific­
ally socialist components.
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The global economic setting has become increasingly uncertain 
and hostile for Tanzania since the early 1970's - as it 
has for most Third (or even First and Second) World
countries. Real exports per capita peaked in 1966 measured 
in volume and 1966 or 1973 measured in import capacity with 
only 1977 even vaguely comparable since (on the import 
capacity side) while real aid per capita peaked in 1973-1975, 
fell precipitously to 1977, partially recovered to 1.980 
and is again declining. Tanzania's ideology has probably 
attracted more aid than it has deterred. However, the 
present crisis has given leverage to IMF and World Bank 
efforts to enforce programmes on Tanzania which clearly 
conflict with its strategy (as well as being arguably 
inappropriate on objective criteria) and to deter rises 
in bilateral aid while negotiating with Tanzania.
Tanzania has diversified external dependence sharply 
since 1967 and reduced it sharply relatively and 
moderately absolutely in respect to foreign personnel.
While the production structure is more integrated and 
more oriented to national demand than in 19 67, basic import 
requirements are absolutely higher (even if lower as a share 
of GDP) and cannot be covered from export earnings plus 
normal grants and loans (as they could be over 1967-73 and 
1976-77). Technological dependence (broadly defined) is 
high. Foreign economic relations - with states, state 
corporations, private TNCs and international agencies - 
are evaluated in terms of Tanzanian requirements, the 
potential partner's ability to meet them and Tanzania's 
ability to maintain control of broad policy and outcome in 
Tanzania. In some cases a certain naivety has been evident 
in judging when 'technical' or 'institutional' packages 
had ideological implications although the overall pattern 
has been one of fairly clearly designed and moderately 
effective negotiation.
"No worst there is none"? - The Post 1977 Crisis
1978-1982 have seen a series of economic setbacks and debacles 
in Tanzania with a continuous, fluctuating, but basically 
deteriorating crisis since early 1979. While overall growth 
held up moderately well until 1981 (when it went negative 
for the first time since independence) industrial output 
declined from 1979 on, the recurrent budget went into 
dramatic imbalance from 1978-79,inflation leaped from 6-10% 
a year (mid 1975-mid 1978) to 30% (1980-82) and the external 
imbalance came to cripple production, the fiscal base and 
investible surplus generation.
It is necessary to look at causes for two reasons. To the 
extent they were external - while evidently requiring Tanzanian 
domestic response - they do not directly imply a basic criticism 
of Tanzanian transition strategy. To the extent they were 
internal, key questions are whether they flowed from the 
strategy, from mistakes in applying it or from deviations 
basically contrary to it.
The external causes and rough direct costs over 1978-82 are: 
the Amin invasion and consequential costs ($700 million), 
bad weather - 1979-82, not 1978 - ($500 million), terms of 
trade deterioration ($1,350 million) for a direct cost of 
$2,500 million or 60% of GDP. The indirect dislocation cost 
of the war ($250 million) and the multiplier impact of 
unfinanceable imports from terms of trade losses and lost 
exports ($2,000 million) bring the total above $4,500 million 
or the equivalent of a full year's output loss over five years. 
Few economies - especially very poor ones - can sustain that 
level of sustained shocks; indeed a number of Sub-Saharan 
African economies have crumbled faster and/or further with 
lesser external loss magnitudes.
The internal causes include:
1. unsound liberalisation of import controls in 1977 and 
delays in restoring them;
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2.'contracting out1 most agricultural policy to a non (or 
externally) responsible expatriate parallel technocracy 
whose achievements include the loss of 600,000 tonnes of 
food reserves and over $200 million by the largest para- 
statal they were to supervise, report on, advise;
3. fiscal laxity over 1977-78/mid 1979-80, and a pronounced 
deterioration in quality of public enterprise accounting 
and financial control over 1975-1980;
4. a basic misjudgement of the 1978 and 1979 world economic 
context seeing 1978's commodity price break and 1979's 
OECD area recession as transitary like their 1973-74
'precedents 1;
5. failure to identify export expansion as critical to 
self reliance even verbally before 1972-74, to place 
serious political priority on it until 1980 or to begin 
priority programme articulation until 1981.
Fairly evidently the first two causes are deviations from, 
not part of the strategy. Given the general emphasis on 
austerity because of an abiding realisation of resource 
scarcity,so is the third. The fourth is non-ideological 
and very far from unique to Tanzania - the number of accurate 
national forecasts of 1978-82 in 1977-78 is close to nil.
The fourth error is an internal contradiction or an analytical 
failure. "Delinking1 enthusiasts (Tanzanian and expatriate) 
were heard to argue that the first thing to do to increase 
self reliance was to reduce exports. The counterattack that 
transformation required an absolute increase of imports, 
only earned import capacity (i.e. export proceeds) was under 
Tanzanian control and widening external resource gaps would 
deliver the strategy bound hand and foot into the jaws of 
creditors and donors was articulated from 1970 but did not 
establish its supremacy before 1980-81.
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The additional failures - breakdowns in transport, increases 
in corruption, inconsistency in cases of physical allocation 
of key inputs or consumer goods, micro misjudgements in 
import allocation, increasingly poor maintenance of capital 
stock - capacity utilisation - service quality are quite 
real but consequential. Were import capacity to be restored 
to 1977 levels they could be reversed - not necessarily easily 
or automatically as some have a life of their own by now - 
as could recurrent budget deficits and 30% inflation rates.
Prospects or Portents
A major change of strategy by CCM is unlikely. Both the 
1981 Mwongozo and the 1982 Chairman's address to the Party 
Conference reassert the principles of the Arusha Declaration 
and 1971 Mwongozo. Interestingly both see increased 
participation, more elected posts, protection of as much 
as possible of basic services and concentrating whatever 
gains can be made on poor workers and peasants as the 
central requirements to make austerity, export development 
and rural production incentives (broadly defined) effective.
The present leadership is prepared to bargain and to cut to 
secure interim external resources but not to turn its coat.
Irritation and anomie have risen - on the other hand cheerfulness, 
morale and belief that the Party and State can reverse the tide 
are (perhaps surprisingly) quite common. Corruption has 
increased but is by no means either the norm or accepted - 
none would publicly say that the basic purpose of public 
office is private gain and to be seen to act in that way 
(beyond fairly marginal areas) frequently (usually?) does 
lead to summary removal from office. A slightly flippant 
commentator observed: "Well, in Tanzania six people seized 
an airplane and in Kenya 16,000 seized a capital city... what 
does that say about relative levels of alienation?"
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The basic constraint is import capacity to maintain and 
operate the existing capital stock and productive forces.
The export development strategy cannot yield it in time. 
Whether either a fortuitous partial terms of trade recovery 
(ending of OECD-CMEA 1979-82 depression? consecutive 
weather/disease destruction of much of the Brazilian coffee 
crop over two seasons? oil price collapse plus three 
consecutive good weather years?) will do so is very doubtful. 
What can be achieved in IMF-World Bank-bilateral negotiations 
is quite unclear.
To be optimistic is difficult - even Gramsci's prescription 
of "Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will" is 
hard to sustain. Two more appropriate touchstones, given 
present Tanzanian Party and State determination (with 
relatively broad support and little overt opposition) to 
press ahead, might be the Lord Krishna's injunction to 
Arjuna on the field of battle "Not fare well but fare 
forward voyagers" or T.S. Elliot's "We who are only 
undefeated because we have gone on trying". Because for 
Tanzania and Tanzanians "Socialism and Self Reliance" are 
simply not an experiment nor perceived as a dispensable 
luxury, discussion of a transition to neo-liberalism, or to 
a Zaiirean or a Ugandan magendo model (both relatively 
viable in their own terms) is not an actual option. To 
go on trying - whatever the apparent prospects of success - 
is a necessity.
1. Reg Green has been a student of Tanzania since 1964.
He has been an adviser, university faculty member and 
civil servant off and on since 1965. However, none 
of this paper is based on confidential information nor 
are the views and analysis to be taken as anything other 
than his personal judgement, opinion and responsibility.
2. This paper is in fact limited to mainland Tanzania. The 
other member of the United Republic, Zanzibar, is 
significantly divergent in enough respects to require 
a separate analysis.
